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As a conjuror in the popular sense of the word, he has indeed few rivals; but as a 
humorist and conjuror combined, he certainly stands alone. Shunning alike the 
pompous air which is assumed by some of his competitors, and the extreme 
urbanity which is affected by others, he talks in a quiet, sarcastic tone, as if 
intending to convince his spectators that, much as he may desire them to admire his 
feats, he is by no means astounded by his own proficiency.... Pretending that the air 
is charged with coins, English and American, he makes a clutch with an empty 
hand, in which he invariably displays a dollar or a shilling, flinging every fresh 
acquisition into a hat…. There is something in the performance of this feat—in this 
industrious realization of something out of nothing—that belongs to the spirit of 
true comedy. 
- John Oxenford on magician Robert Heller in The Times (1868) 
 
I believe that one of the reasons scientists and other intelligent audiences so delight 
in smart and stylish conjuring (as has consistently been my professional experience) 
is because they view magic as a burlesque of their own work. 
- Jamy Ian Swiss (2002b, 269) 
 
I have the rare and most excellent honor of being able to call [magician] Jamy Ian 
Swiss my good friend. I have learned much from my association with him: that I 
can still be fooled, repeatedly it seems; that watching impossible things happen in 
front of me makes me laugh uncontrollably; and finally, that secret arts and mystery 
still have an important and vital role to play in the world. 
- Adam Savage, co-host of Mythbusters (Savage n.d.) 
 
I’m Steve Martin, and I’ll be out here in a minute. Uh, while I’m—while I’m 
waiting for me, I’d like to jump right into kind of a socko-boffo comedy routine. 
This has really been a big one for me, it’s the one that kinda put me where I am 
today. I’d like to start right off—this is really a big one: the fabulous glove-into-
dove trick. 
- Steve Martin on The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour (1968) 
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In his 1968 TV debut, Steve Martin appears on stage next to a small table draped with a 
gold-fringed red velvet cloth. The table holds what are obviously magic props, including a white 
glove, a tall candle, and a silver ball. After promising to “jump right into a socko-boffo comedy 
routine,” Martin takes the white glove from the table and announces a magic trick. This may seem 
like a non-sequitur, but the audience knows the schtick: in a pattern familiar from performers such 
as Carl Ballantine and Tommy Cooper, the comedian will make a mockery of the magic: his tricks 
will all fail in some amusing way. But here’s what happens: first, Martin throws the glove into the 
air and it lands lamely on the table; next, without skipping a beat, he does “the napkin trick,” in 
which he pokes his tongue through a paper napkin. The audience  realizes: this isn’t Ballantine-
style failure magic; it’s pure absurdist comedy. However, Martin’s third trick, “the candle trick,” 
shifts gears: it seems to be a legitimate magic trick in which a two-foot candle vanishes from under 
a handkerchief. Again, however, things aren’t quite as they seem: after receiving the audience’s 
applause with both arms extended, he drops only his right arm. His left arm remains aloft, rigidly—
and hilariously—sticking out from his side. Obviously, the candle is up his sleeve! It’s failure 
magic after all! But Martin still isn’t through with us: as he turns back toward the table for the next 
prop, he suddenly drops his left arm, bends it sharply while making a fist, and grabs his left bicep 
with his right hand: it’s a bras d’honneur. This gesture—which reads as an aside, a piece of meta-
performance delivered on an off-beat—serves two purposes: (1) it proves that he didn’t sleeve the 
candle; and (2) it tells the audience—and their expectation that they’ll always be one step ahead 
of the bumbling magician—to “fuck off.” Through a series of rapid reversals, Martin shows that 
he is not what he initially seemed to be: a failure-magician in the Ballantine-Cooper mold. There’s 
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actual magic in his act—and it’s good, too. While Ballantine and Cooper mock standard magic 
performance with funny failures, Martin’s tricks are either absurdist non-tricks—as in the glove-
into-dove and napkin tricks—or strong pieces of magic: first, the vanishing candle; and second, 
his closer, “the toilet-float trick,” in which a silver ball floats magically around the stage until it 
disobediently drags Martin from the theater, “headed for the john.” 
Within the scope of comedy, Ballantine’s and Cooper’s performances are instances of 
“punching up.” Canonically, the magician is an elegant, dextrous, and self-assured white man who 
uses secret knowledge to fool us. This makes for easy comedy: portray the white male magician 
as an idiot whose deceptive stratagems fail spectacularly. But Martin is up to something else—
something more difficult. His absurdist routine is also a real magic act, and it neither encourages 
nor supports the sort of easy derision toward magic and magicians that animates Ballantine’s and 
Cooper’s performances. The latter do standup comedy about magic; Martin is doing standup 
comedy and magic—or better, standup comedy magic. 
This difference deserves attention. A performance in the Ballantine-Cooper style requires 
no special relationship between comedy and magic. The magician is a just one of many possible 
comic targets. On the other hand, by seamlessly integrating comedy and magic, Martin’s 
performance raises the question whether comedy and magic have a special relationship. The goal 
of this article is to show that they do. I will argue for the perhaps surprising conclusion that magic 
is a form—or, at least, a limit-case—of standup comedy. If I’m right, this will help to explain the 
easy integration of magic and comedy in Martin’s act—and a great deal more besides. 
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The article has five parts. Part 1 motivates the argument with five points in favor of thinking 
that magic and standup comedy are deeply, essentially related. Part 2 secures the argument’s 
conceptual foundations with definitions of both ‘standup comedy’ and ‘magic’. As it turns out, 
whether magic counts as a form of standup will depend on whether successful magic performances 
count as objects of comic amusement. Part 3 shows that they do—at least according to one 
prominent contemporary philosophical theory of humor. Part 4 considers objections. Part 5 
concludes. 
 
——— 1 ——— 
Why think that magic and standup comedy might be deeply, essentially related? Here are 
five reasons. 
(i) It is widely believed that, before the rise of modern magic in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, audiences regularly mistook magicians for real wizards. But, according to historians 
Peter Lamont and Jim Steinmeyer, there is little evidence for this view (2018). They argue 
convincingly that magic tricks (pretty much as we know them) have been enjoyed (pretty much as 
we enjoy them) for a long time. In fact, even “throughout the age of witchcraft, jugglers performed 
magic tricks without persecution, because their audiences understood that they were watching 
tricks” (2018, 24). Thus, consider Hocus Pocus (né William Vincent), the big name in 17th century 
British conjuring. In 1634, he published the first book in English dedicated entirely to teaching 
magic, and his readers would not have been surprised to find the following passage near the 
beginning of his text: 
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The end of this Art is either good or bad, accordingly as it is used: Good, and 
lawfull, when it is used at Festivals, and merry meetings to procure mirth: especially 
if it be done without desire of estimation above what we are. Bad, and altogether 
unlawfull when it is used on purpose, to cozen, deceive, or for vain glory to be 
esteemed above what is meet and honest. (1634, 2) 
 
In other words, the use of the magician’s techniques is illegitimate (“unlawfull”) if they are 
deployed to mislead the audience about, say, the real powers of the performer. By contrast, in a 
legitimate (“lawfull”) use, the performer aims not to convince but “to procure mirth.” The former 
is charlatanry. The latter is conjuring. It is good clean fun, and it requires being honest about what’s 
happening—at least to the extent of admitting that it’s trickery. But what’s most important here is 
how Vincent—one of the most successful early performers of magic—characterizes its end-goal: 
mirth. Not wonder, nor amazement, but mirth: apparently the same end as comedy.1 
(ii) Laughter is one of the most common responses to strong magic. Neuroscientist Susana 
Martinez-Conde explains: 
Magic audiences not only laugh at the magician’s jokes, but also at the magical 
effects themselves: the reading of a spectator’s mind, the disappearance of a coin 
into thin air, the transmutation of the ace of spaces into the queen of hearts, all 
provoke hilarity. (2015) 
 
This fits neatly with Vincent’s description of the proper goal of magic performance; and if Lamont 
and Steinmeyer are right about the history, then people have probably been laughing at magic 
tricks for centuries. That said, laughter can express many things, including anxiety. (And magic 
tricks do make some people anxious.) So far, then, it’s not clear that we’re entitled to describe the 
audience’s laughter as an expression of “hilarity.” 
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(iii) Magic and standup comedy have a very close historical relationship. For example, 
standup has its origins in vaudeville (in the US) and music hall or “variety” (in the UK), which 
were also primary venues for magicians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.2 Later, in the 1970s 
and 80s, when modern standup came into its own and comedy clubs sprang up around the United 
States, magicians turned to those clubs for work. Despite being tagged as “prop comics,” some of 
them achieved substantial success. Harry Anderson’s act was eventually recorded for a 1986 
Showtime special, and many of today’s top performing magicians started out on the comedy 
circuit. For example, Mac King—arguably “the best comedy magician in the world” (Maven 2008, 
64)—did comedy clubs for 20 years before landing his Las Vegas show, now in its 20th year at 
Harrah’s (King 2017, 39). Even today, magicians commonly work comedy clubs. And, then, of 
course, there are the standup comedians who started out as magicians, most notably Johnny Carson 
and Steve Martin. 
(iv) To say that magic acts standardly incorporate comedy would be a serious 
understatement. It’s fair to say that comedy is the performing magician’s primary theatrical mode.3 
There are, of course, magic acts with serious moments that don’t aim to amuse, but the same can 
be said of standup comedy. (Consider, for instance, the recent work of Hannah Gadsby.) The fact 
is that—at least in contemporary magic—a comic tone is overwhelmingly more common than, say, 
a dramatic or didactic tone. Perhaps this is merely a historical accident; but I doubt it—and I think 
this is reflected in the fact that “serious” magic shows seem to run a special sort of theatrical risk: 
namely, of becoming ridiculous, acts to be laughed at rather than laughed with. It’s as if they’re in 
danger of forgetting what they are.4 
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(v) The dominant contemporary account of humor holds that comic amusement is a 
response to incongruity. A successful magic performance apparently presents an impossible event. 
What could be more incongruous than this? Still, not all incongruities are humorous—even among 
those that elicit laughter. Consider again the nervous laughter sometimes provoked by anxiety-
inducing incongruities. Perhaps magical incongruities are of this sort. 
These points do not by themselves establish this article’s thesis.5 However, they are 
suggestive, and they require explanation. Of course, I think that the best explanation is that magic 
is a form of standup comedy, and I turn now to direct arguments for this claim. My primary 
argument primarily develops point (v): I will show that magic tricks plausibly satisfy all of the 
conditions on humor laid out in one of today’s best-developed philosophical theories of humor. 
First, however, I need to say a bit more about what both standup and magic are, and what it’s like 
to experience the latter. 
 
——— 2 ——— 
Standup comedy is two things: standup and comedy. 
A performance or work is a piece of comedy if and only if comically amusing its audience 
figures among its primary aims. It follows that being funny is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
being comedy. Tommy Wiseau’s The Room is hilariously bad, but this does not make it comedy; 
and the nervous first-timer at the open mic is doing comedy even if their act is excruciatingly 
unfunny. In general, a piece of comedy succeeds (or fails) as comedy only by being (or failing to 
be) funny. (It can of course succeed (or fail) in other respects at the same time—say, by being 
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morally praiseworthy (or repugnant)—and this may have consequences for the comedy (see Smuts 
2009; Anderson 2015; Olin 2016; Lintott 2017, 363–4).) 
As I use the term, a performance is a standup performance if and only if it presents the 
performer as genuinely present to a live audience. To be presented as genuinely present to a 
particular audience is to be presented as someone who is now in front of this audience, and so, 
available to them for real-time interaction. In this respect, even if the performer “plays a role” or 
“adopts a persona,” it is the role or persona of someone present to precisely this audience, in this 
space, at this time. As a standup performer, when you walk out on stage, you purport to present 
your “real world” self, even if it’s not your “real world” self that you present.6 In short, in standup 
performances, there is no “fourth wall.” The audience sees you, and you see them. This is why, as 
a standup performer, even if you adopt a persona, you can’t avoid acknowledging your audience.7 
Thus defined, most “standup performances” are not instances of standup comedy. For 
example, most musical performances count as standup performances, but most musical 
performances don’t have the production of comic amusement among their principal aims. 
Furthermore, as I’ve defined it, standup comedy is a very flexible thing. Any standup performance 
that has the production of comic amusement among its principal aims will count as standup 
comedy. This means that some of what I count as standup comedy will not be conventionally 
recognized as such. It doesn’t have to be one person, one mic in a comedy club. It doesn’t have to 
involve joke-telling, or even telling at all. It may be all music, or gesture, or whatever.8 
Clearly, then, the point of my definition of ‘standup comedy’ is not to capture conventional 
usage. (If conventional usage were the issue, it would be obtuse—and a non-starter—to argue that 
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magic is a form of standup comedy.) The point of the definition is rather to identify an important 
concept, one that helps us to parse reality in useful and interesting ways—perhaps in part by 
revealing connections we might have otherwise failed to notice. In this respect, the definition has 
metaphysical import (cf. Lintott 2017, 363). It is in this same spirit that I argue elsewhere for the 
definition of ‘magic’ to which I now turn. 
As I understand it, “[m]agic is a form of theater that apparently presents impossible events 
and at the same time represents them as impossible. In other words, magic apparently presents 
impossibilities—as impossibilities” (Leddington 2016, 256). This definition incorporates three 
main ideas. 
First, the point of a magic performance is to give the audience the experience of apparently 
witnessing the impossible; to this end, the performance must do more than represent an impossible 
event: it must actually appear to present it. In this respect, there is no “fourth wall” in magic 
performance, which depicts impossible events as really happening before—and perhaps even to—
the live audience. By contrast, in conventional theater, the “fourth wall” that separates us from 
depicted events prevents us from (even apparently) witnessing them; instead, the action on stage 
functions as an invitation for us to imagine them. This is why seeing the “mechanics” of a play—
say, that Hamlet’s sword is actually made of wood—doesn’t interfere with our experience of the 
performance, because it doesn’t interfere with our imagination. But when magician Helga Moretti 
invites audience members to thrust fourteen swords through a cardboard box barely large enough 
to contain her husband, we must be convinced that the swords are genuinely sharp and deadly (they 
are). Anything less than conviction ruins the performance because it destroys the illusion. So, 
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unlike conventional theatrical performances, magic performances are essentially standup 
performances: absent the fourth wall, the magician stands before the audience and addresses it 
directly—just like the standup comedian (Leddington 2016, 255). 
Second, the magician must present what he or she does as impossible. When pseudo-
psychic Uri Geller pretends to bend spoons with his mind, he tells the audience, “I’m doing it, so 
it must be possible.” This is charlatanry. By contrast, the magician says, “It’s impossible, it can’t 
be done—but watch,” and then appears to do it, anyway. While the charlatan aims to mislead us 
about what’s possible, the magician openly uses our shared knowledge of the limits of the possible 
to create an experience as of the impossible. This openness is ethically significant, but it also 
matters theatrically and aesthetically. The performer’s honesty is part of a theatrical frame within 
which otherwise potentially threatening experiences can be had in safety, and so, enjoyed. 
Third, the audience’s active disbelief is essential to a magic performance. If magician 
Amélie van Tass of The Clairvoyants presents a pseudo-psychic routine to an audience that 
believes in psychic phenomena, they will marvel at her abilities, but they will not experience her 
performance as magical. Magic performances are not demonstrations of unusual or impressive 
abilities—even as possessed by magicians. So, when Ricky Jay appears to make things vanish, 
he’s doing magic; but when he displays his extraordinary ability to throw (or “scale”) playing 
cards, he’s not. When David Blaine appears to bite a piece out of a quarter (and to restore it by 
blowing on it), he’s doing magic; when he demonstrates that he can hold his breath underwater for 
17 minutes, he’s not. Such feats are impressive, but we don’t think they’re impossible, so we don’t 
experience them as magical. In order for a performance to count as magic, the audience must 
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believe that the events the magician appears to present are impossible, and therefore, not actually 
happening. In other words, the audience must be aware of, and accept, the theatrical frame 
discussed above. 
What’s it like to experience a magic performance, so understood? A great magic 
performance puts you in a state of mind you can express by saying, “I know it’s a trick, but I don’t 
see how it could be.” You know it’s a trick because you know (and the magician admits) that what 
seems to happen in the performance is actually impossible. If it nevertheless seems to happen, 
there must be trickery. At the same time, however, you don’t see how it could be a trick because 
the performance is structured to deprive you of any plausible explanation for what you’ve 
witnessed. To this end, the magician aims not only to conceal the method behind the trick, but to 
conceal this concealment. During a good magic performance, it should feel that everything is “fair” 
and in view, that the magician has no opportunity for deception. Thus, it’s common for people to 
exclaim, “No way!” in response to strong magic; they mean it literally: they see no way for that to 
be done. 
Returning now to our question: how does magic, so understood, relate to standup comedy, 
so understood? Well, like standup comedy, magic performance is essentially a standup affair. So, 
whether magic counts as standup comedy depends on whether magic essentially aims to produce 
comic amusement. Part 3 presents an argument for this conclusion. 
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——— 3 ——— 
Comedy is—or at least aims to be—funny, and so, to evoke comic amusement. Arguably, 
however, magic aims at something quite different: a type of aporetic experience that I call “the 
experience of magic” (Leddington 2016; 2017). Still, there’s reason to think that, when 
successful—and when properly appreciated—magic performances are objects of comic 
amusement. In other words, there’s reason to think that magic performances essentially aim to 
comically amuse, and so, that comic amusement is an ingredient in the experience of magic, 
broadly conceived. In what follows, I’ll argue for this claim by showing that the responses that 
magic performances aim to produce satisfy all of the conditions for comic amusement in one of 
the best-developed contemporary philosophical theories of humor. 
According to Noël Carroll, 
creatures like us are in a state of comic amusement just in case (i) the object of 
one’s mental state is a perceived incongruity which (ii) one regards as non-
threatening or otherwise anxiety producing, and (iii) not annoying and (iv) towards 
which one does not enlist genuine problem-solving attitudes (v) but which gives 
rise to enjoyment of precisely the pertinent incongruity and (vi) to an experience of 
levity. And humor then is the response-dependent object of comic amusement, 
characterized thus. (Carroll 2014, 49–50). 
 
I claim that the audience response at which magic performance aims satisfies all of these 
conditions. 
(i) Perceived incongruity. In a successful magic performance, the audience is apparent 
witness to an impossible event. But to experience an event as impossible is precisely to experience 
it as not fitting in—in the strongest possible way—to the causal order of everyday experience. 
Thus, as Teller puts it, “you experience magic as real and unreal at the same time” (Stromberg, 
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n.d.). Clearly, then, in the experience of magic, the object of one’s mental state is a perceived 
incongruity. 
(ii) Non-threatening or otherwise anxiety producing. When something you otherwise 
believe to be impossible seems to happen, context is everything. In a marketing stunt for the 2013 
remake of Brian De Palma’s 1976 cinematic adaptation of Stephen King’s Carrie, viral video 
agency Thinkmodo created a fake psychokinetic event in a New York City coffee shop.9 Unwitting 
customers were “scared shitless” (“Coffee Shop Customer in ‘Carrie’ Viral Video Speaks Out” 
2013). But not even the most convincing piece of pseudo-telekinesis in a magic show will inspire 
fear, be perceived as dangerous, or produce anxiety, unless the audience misunderstands or rejects 
the theatrical frame within which it is presented.10 As mentioned above, the magician’s openness 
about the use of deception to create the illusion of the impossible is essential to this theatrical 
frame. (Note, too, that humorous incongruities display a similar context-sensitivity. An utterance 
that’s hilarious in a joking context can be brutally offensive—and threatening—outside of it.) 
(iii) Not annoying. A good magic performance makes you apparent witness to an 
impossibility. While you know—and the performer admits—that it is “just a trick,” it remains the 
case that, if the performance is fully successful, you can’t even begin to explain it. This can annoy 
in two ways: first, being fooled by the magician can feel like being made a fool of; and second, 
being unable to explain something can be frustrating. Fine. But this just means: magic is not for 
the epistemically uptight. Compare tastes in humor: 
Imagine the cutlery laid out for a formal dinner. Suppose that the salad fork is in 
the wrong place. If you are the sort of person who is disturbed by such deviations 
from the norm, you will not be capable of finding this amusing. One the other hand, 
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if you are more easy-going about such matters and also aware of the incongruity, it 
may elicit a chuckle. That is, you may find the error amusing or not. But if you find 
it genuinely amusing, you cannot find it annoying. Moreover, if you find black 
humor amusing, you can be sure that there are others who will find it annoying, 
even extremely so. And you revel in their discomfort. (Carroll 2014, 34) 
 
So, just as you may or may not have a taste for black humor, you may or may not have a taste for 
magic.11 
(iv) No genuine problem-solving attitudes. One way to appreciate a magic performance is 
to shut down your critical faculties and simply enjoy the spectacle. But to do so is to miss the point: 
you might as well just watch a visually stunning movie. To experience the performance as the 
magician wants you to experience it—namely, as the apparent presentation of an impossibility—
requires that you both try and fail to explain what you witness. Magician Darwin Ortiz writes: 
Magic can only be established by a process of elimination. There is no way that you 
can directly apprehend that you’re witnessing magic [viz., the presentation of an 
impossible event]. You conclude that it’s magic because there is no alternative. 
Therefore, the primary task in giving someone the experience of witnessing magic 
is to eliminate every other possible cause. (Ortiz 2006, 37) 
 
We try to explain what we see and discover we have no grip on how to do so; only thus do we 
experience it as if it were impossible. So, having the experience of magic requires that we deploy 
problem-solving attitudes. At the same time, however, those attitudes aren’t genuine. We want the 
performance to withstand our best efforts to figure it out, and we’ll be disappointed if it doesn’t. 
True, many will ask the magician, “How did you do that?” and occasionally they mean it. Typically, 
however, even if an explanation is offered, they will refuse it: “No, wait—I don’t want to know!” 
(v) The pertinent incongruity is enjoyed. So, good magic leaves us at a loss, and even when 
the explanation is offered, we typically refuse it. Why? Not (generally) because we want to figure 
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it out for ourselves, but because we want to preserve and enjoy the incongruity itself. People who 
enjoy magic savor the incongruities that it delivers. Moreover, magical incongruities seem to be 
especially memorable. Witnesses to a strong piece of magic can often recall the experience in 
surprising detail—and relish recounting it—many years later.12 In this way, magic tricks can be 
enjoyed long after we first experience them, much in the same way that we can crack ourselves up 
by bringing to mind the punchline to a good joke. 
(vi) It gives rise to an experience of levity. That magic provides an experience of levity, of 
lightness and play, is incontestable. Recall William Vincent, Hocus Pocus himself, who describes 
magic’s goal as the production of mirth. If magic wasn’t fun, it would be hard to understand why 
we would hire magicians to perform at parties, see their shows when we’re vacationing, or feature 
them on light-hearted TV. 
In sum, magic performance aims to produce a response that satisfies all of Carroll’s 
conditions on comic amusement. Thus, if we have good reason to accept those conditions, then we 
have good reason to accept that successful magic tricks are humorous, and so, that magic is a 
standup art that aims essentially at the production of comic amusement; in other words, we have 
good reason to think that magic is a form of standup comedy. But do we have good reason to accept 
Carroll’s conditions? 
 
——— 4 ——— 
Perhaps not. Perhaps Carroll is wrong, and perhaps I’ve just shown it. Someone 
antecedently convinced that magic is not humorous might treat the argument of Part 3 as the 
 Comic Impossibilities   
 16 
production of a counterexample to Carroll’s conditions, if not to incongruity theories of humor in 
general. What’s to prevent someone from taking this tack? 
To begin with, I don’t think there is a non-ad-hoc way simply to reject the conclusion that 
magic aims at comic amusement. Magic may not be canonical comedy, but the similarities are 
striking. And while it is surely good philosophical practice to be cautious about the dangers of 
oversimplification—the ways a single label can obscure diverse phenomena—it is equally 
necessary to question hard lines and dichotomies where we might instead find fuzzy boundaries 
and continuities. 
Furthermore, the present argument doesn’t require that we accept Carroll’s theory full stop. 
It requires only that satisfying Carroll’s conditions be sufficient for comic amusement. Thus, we 
can follow Jerrold Levinson and adopt a more catholic stance, one open to the possibility that 
comic amusement might sometimes be a response to something other than perceived incongruity 
(2006, 392, 395–7). Nevertheless, as Levinson points out, 
[e]ven if…incongruity is not a necessary condition or component of humorousness, 
no account of humor can fail to accord it a special status. Beyond the fact of being 
the most common focus of humor, its special status may consist in the following. 
First, there is reason to think that superior forms of humor—those which are most 
satisfying, intellectually and emotionally—all rely on incongruity in one way or 
another. Second, there may be categories of humor, for instance, that of jokes, which 
are unthinkable apart from incongruity…. (2006, 398) 
 
The present account suggests that magic is one such category. 
Still, you might balk. You might think that, ceteris paribus, we should prefer not to count 
magic as a form of humor. So, you might hold out hope for a theory that carves responses to 
incongruity a bit more finely than Carroll’s. And perhaps there is such a theory. In the course of a 
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recent book-length defense of a novel version of incongruity theory, Alan Roberts claims that 
“astonishment at magic tricks” is one of several “cases of non-amusement” that constitutes a 
“potential counter-example” to his view (2019, 118–19). While he “concede[s] that astonishment 
at magic and amusement at humor are closely related, after all, magic tricks often elicit smiles and 
laughter,” he nevertheless seems to think it’s obvious that we should exclude magic from the 
domain of humor (2019, 119). So, he seeks grounds for doing so: he claims that “magic tricks do 
not create cognitive dissonance in the same way that the cognitive component of amusement does” 
(2019, 119). However, it’s hard to see how Roberts’ argument is supposed to go. According to his 
theory, humor works by activating in the subject “two inconsistent interpretations [of the object] 
via unsound reasoning” (2019, 116). This is precisely what happens in magic. A successful magic 
performance uses deception to compel the audience to reason to the conclusion that an 
impossibility has just occurred. Of course, the audience knows that impossibilities can’t happen, 
and so, knows their reasoning is unsound. The trick is (literally) that they don’t see how it could 
be. Magician Whit Haydn writes: 
All magic is based on creating a logical argument in the spectator’s mind. The 
argument...is false. If we can get the audience to agree step by step with each 
premise of the argument, even the false ones, we have created a sort of illogical box 
or prison from which escape is difficult…. [T]he audience is forced to agree with 
the conclusion. But they know the conclusion is impossible. The result is a feeling 
of cognitive dissonance—“I know there is no such thing as magic/There is no other 
explanation.” (2009, 5–6; cf. Ortiz 2006, 37) 
 
In this respect, the performance leaves the audience with two inconsistent interpretations of the 
same event—just as Roberts’ theory requires.13 So, the right thing to say is that both Carroll’s and 
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Roberts’ theories count magic as a form of humor. And contra Roberts, we should not treat this as 
a counterexample; we should treat it as an insight. 
Why? Because philosophical theories should aspire to do more than mirror our intuitions. 
There is no reason to think that our pre-philosophical ideas about humor and comic amusement 
are free of blindspots. So, a good theory should not only regiment existing judgments, it should 
also correct them when necessary. In other words, a good theory will do more than organize old 
knowledge, it will generate new insights—some of which might require rejecting otherwise firm 
intuitions. Of course, to abandon a particular intuition may strike us as ill-motivated absent any 
explanation of why intuition and theory diverge in that particular case. In this spirit, then, let’s 
consider why magic might not seem to fit neatly in the domain of humor even though it satisfies 
plausible sufficient conditions for doing so. Ideally, this will both help to situate magic in relation 
to canonical forms of humor and to relax residual resistance to the idea that magic is a form of 
standup comedy. 
A question for any incongruity theory of humor is whether we enjoy the incongruity itself 
or only its resolution. As John Morreall notes, the enjoyment of unresolved—or unresolvable—
incongruity has seemed “perverse or immature” to “a number of respected philosophers and 
psychologists…. According to Thomas Schultz, for instance, children over the age of seven and 
adults require not just incongruity in order to be amused, but the resolution of that incongruity” 
(Morreall 1987, 196–97; see Schultz 1976). If this were true, then magic’s unresolved—and 
seemingly unresolvable—incongruities could not be a source of genuine comic amusement for 
adults. Fortunately, it’s not true. Perhaps “[i]n most jokes…the incongruity is resolved on some 
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level,” but when it comes to thinking about humor “we should not limit ourselves only to jokes, as 
many psychologists have done” (Morreall 1987, 197). And once we cast the net more broadly, we 
see that “[h]umor based on unresolved incongruity” is widespread, “not only in jokes and cartoons, 
but also in real life” (Morreall 1987, 199). Indeed, it is at the heart of Steve Martin’s act described 
at the beginning of this article. His glove-into-dove and napkin tricks are incongruous, but their 
incongruity is never resolved; they remain “simply absurd” (Morreall 1987, 199). In this way, they 
implement an idea that, according to Martin, 
revolutionized my comic direction: What if there were no punch lines? What if 
there were no indicators? What if I created tension and never released it? What if I 
headed for a climax, but all I delivered was an anticlimax? What would the audience 
do with all that tension? Theoretically, it would have to come out sometime. But if 
I kept denying them the formality of a punch line, the audience would eventually 
pick their own place to laugh, essentially out of desperation. This type of laugh 
seemed stronger to me, as they would be laughing at something they chose, rather 
than being told exactly when to laugh. (Martin 2007, 111) 
 
This is comedy that, contrary to appearances, requires for its full appreciation a high degree of 
active engagement from the audience. Much like magic—and unlike much set-up-and-punch-line 
comedy—it is not something you can appreciate properly if you simply “take it in.” Indeed, just 
like magic, “getting” Martin’s act requires trying—and failing—to make sense of it. We get it in 
not getting it. Thus, Martin writes: “My goal was to make the audience laugh but leave them unable 
to describe what it was that had made them laugh” (Martin 2007, 113). In my experience, this is 
precisely the sort of laughter that magic generates. Ask someone who is laughing at a magic trick, 
“Why are you laughing?” and you’re likely to get a puzzled reply: “I don’t know!” The correct 
answer, I think, finds expression in an exclamation that strong magic can provoke: “What? That 
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makes no sense!” Just as in Martin’s absurdist routine, there is nothing to “get” in magic but a type 
of not-getting. In other words, what’s amusing in both is an apparently unresolvable “derangement 
of sense” (Carroll 2014, 36).14 
How does this help to explain the intuition that that magic does not fit neatly in the domain 
of humor despite satisfying plausible conditions for doing so? Well, Martin is one of the most 
important performers in the history of standup comedy, but some early reviewers denied that his 
act fit neatly in the domain: “My first reviews came in. One said, ‘This so-called “comedian” 
should be told that jokes are supposed to have punch lines’” (Martin 2007, 113). Such reviewers 
didn’t get the not-getting that Martin wanted them to experience. They were insensitive to the 
thoughtful, provocative way in which he played with unresolved incongruity. If this was enough 
to tempt them to deny that he counted as a comedian, we should not be much moved by the intuition 
that magic doesn’t fit neatly into the domain of humor (even though it satisfies plausible conditions 
for doing so). Instead, fully embracing the possibility of humor based on unresolved incongruity, 
we should accept that magic performances are proper objects of comic amusement, and that magic 
is a form of standup comedy.15 
 
——— 5 ——— 
Taking magic to be a form of standup comedy has significant explanatory payoff. First, it 
illuminates the nature and integrity Martin’s act: it’s neither comedy about magic nor comedy plus 
magic; it’s a unified performance of the comedy of unresolved incongruity. Second, it makes sense 
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of the various close relationships between magic and comedy—historical and otherwise—that I 
enumerated in Part 1. 
Of course, even if I’m right, questions remain. Here are two. First, there are other types of 
performance—in particular, ventriloquism and juggling—that typically receive comic treatment. 
“Serious” juggling and ventriloquism acts are perhaps even less common than “serious” magic 
acts. So, do they, too, deserve to be treated as forms of standup comedy? Second, even if most 
magic acts incorporate canonical comedy, some do not. What are we to say about them? Is the idea 
of serious magic a contradiction in terms? I’ll conclude with brief replies to these questions, though 
they deserve much deeper consideration than I can give them here. 
As Martin indicates in the passage quoted above, comedy thrives on tension (2007, 111). 
So we might expect that, other things being equal, increasing tension will enhance a comic effect 
and that comedy will be well-complemented by tension-raising genres and performance-types. 
This helps to explain the common coincidence of humor and horror (Carroll 1999, 146); and it 
perhaps completely explains the conjunction of comedy and juggling. There is, however, no reason 
to think that juggling itself is a form of comedy; it is simply a tension-raising demonstration of 
skill. 
Ventriloquism is a more interesting case. A successful performance creates the illusion that 
what is visibly an inanimate object is conscious and capable of intelligent speech (Goldblatt 2017, 
367–9). In this respect, the object of our experience is a perceived incongruity. Thus, our response 
to ventriloquism satisfies one of Carroll’s six conditions for comic amusement; and while I can’t 
defend it here, I believe it also satisfies the other five.16 So, I believe that ventriloquism should 
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also be counted as a form of standup comedy. As David Goldblatt writes: “[This] may well be the 
most important thing one can say about ventriloquism…. [W]hen a man comes on stage with a 
dummy, a stupid-looking puppet, for the most part, we can bet that comedy is about to happen” 
(2017, 372). Yet Goldblatt thinks that “[v]entriloquism is contingently a comic act” (2017, 372). I 
think there are grounds for a bolder claim: like magic, ventriloquism is essentially comic. 
But does this mean that it’s impossible to do “serious” magic or ventriloquism? In one 
respect, the answer is yes. In both cases, the medium is part of the message, and indissolubly so. 
A magic or ventriloquism performance may downplay its comic character, but to eliminate it 
altogether is impossible. To try to do so is to flirt with incoherence. Both are essentially playful 
engagements with incongruities of a particular sort, and performers ignore this at their own peril. 
There is something essentially ridiculous about a magic act performed with unironic gravitas or a 
ventriloquist who treats the dummy as a serious theatrical agent. In the case of magic, this finds 
expression in a comic trope most memorably embodied by the character G.O.B. in the TV series 
Arrested Development: the magician who, out of ignorance, or fear of artistic triviality, earnestly 
insists that we treat every trick as a profound mystery. 
Again, none of this is to deny that—like canonical comedy—both magic and ventriloquism 
can treat serious subjects and have serious moments. And inasmuch as we experience magic’s 
incongruities only in experiencing our own cognitive limitations—we experience a performance 
as impossible only in experiencing our own failure to explain it—magic does bear an essential and 
distinctive connection to the topic of mystery (Swiss 2002b; 2017). In fact, this is another point of 
possible resistance to counting magic as a form of standup comedy. Unlike canonical absurdist 
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humor, magic’s unresolved incongruities constitutively depend on the audience’s ignorance. This 
is the disquieting aporetic dimension of the experience of magic mentioned above (Leddington 
2016, 261; 2017, 378). The fact is that, no matter how playful a successful magic performance is, 
there is something essentially unnerving about it. It’s rare to have your cognitive limitations laid 
so bare, and it stays with you. As Whit Haydn says, a good magic trick leaves you “with a burr 
under the saddle of the mind” (2009, 6). So, while “[t]here is something in [magic]… that belongs 
to the spirit of true comedy,” there is also something in magic that is in tension with it (Oxenford 
1868, 5). In this respect, even if magic counts as a form of standup comedy, it lies at the limit of 
the genre, and the very best magical performers exploit and explore this rich liminal space.17 
——— 
In one of this article’s epigraphs, magician and essayist Jamy Ian Swiss describes magic as 
“a burlesque” of science. We’re now in a position to understand this idea. In apparently presenting 
us with impossibilities, the magician playfully exposes the limits of our understanding. We are 
amused even as we ask, “But how?” In this way, magic comically re-enacts something deeply 
serious: the moment of aporetic not-knowing, of wonder, that, according to Aristotle, lies at the 
root of all inquiry (Met. 982b12).18 
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1 It’s true that in 1634 ‘mirth’ had a broader use than today: according to the OED, it could be used to speak generally 
of “pleasurable feeling” or “enjoyment.” Nevertheless, one of its central uses even then was to denote “[g]aiety or 
lightness of mood or mind, esp. as manifested in laughter; merriment, hilarity. In early use also: a jest (obsolete). In 
some early quots. with connotation of ridicule or mockery” (“Mirth, n.” 2019). 
2 On the American and British roots of standup, see Oliver Double (2014, chs. 3–4). Double’s discussion includes a 
representative variety program from 1938 that features both a “comedian” and a “comedy magician” (2014, 36–7). 
3 See, for example, the discussion of the three performance styles in the chapter on the presentation of magic in Jean 
Hugard and Frederick Braué’s seminal and massively influential Expert Card Technique (1974[1944], Part 6, ch. 2). 
Their first and third performance styles are essentially comic; the second is not. However, this style—that of “the 
Merlin who nudges the occult in his performances, who wishes his audiences to believe, if ever so little, that he 
possesses powers not granted to the rest of the world”—is, they admit, one that does “not readily lend itself to general 
magic of the type under discussion.” Indeed, performances in this style come dangerously close to violating Vincent’s 
rules for the “lawfull” use of magical techniques and of no longer counting as magic at all (see Part 2 below). 
4 Generally, even performers who cultivate a more serious mien crack plenty of jokes during their live shows. For 
example, David Copperfield is best known for his earnest and sentimental 1980s TV performances, but his regular 
Vegas show is full of dry, even biting humor. More on the theatrical risks of “serious” magic in Part 5. 
5 For one thing, some of the very same claims could be made about juggling or ventriloquism. I return to this point in 
Part 5. 
6 This can get complicated. For example, on The Colbert Report, Stephen Colbert parodied a conservative TV talkshow 
host. He adopted this persona so thoroughly and consistently and the irony was so layered that it was sometimes 
difficult for even well-posted viewers know what Colbert himself believed. Nevertheless, they understood at least this: 
Colbert was not simply acting the part of a conservative talkshow host; he was presenting himself as acting the part 
of a conservative talkshow host. Either would count as standup, but the difference is significant. If Colbert just acts a 
part, then what Colbert himself believes is potentially invisible; the performance invites us to attend only to the 
character. But if Colbert presents himself as acting a part, then the performance invites us to attend both to Colbert 
and to his character, and so, to the relationship between them. This ironic gap is where parody lives. Much of the fun 
of watching The Colbert Report lay in following this complex presentational dynamic. 
7 My definition is a good fit with the one Oliver Double develops in his excellent Getting the Joke: The Inner Workings 
of Stand-up Comedy (2014, esp. chs. 1 and 19). 
8 Arguably, this flexibility is a strength, not a weakness. As Oliver Double notes in a chapter on the “outer limits” of 
stand-up: “One of the things that makes stand-up comedy so difficult to define is that its boundaries are fluid and 
fuzzy” (2014, 77). 
9 As of this writing, the video is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlOxlSOr3_M. 
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10 This requires some qualification. For example, some tricks are structured to create the impression that the performer 
might come to harm if things go awry (sometimes this impression is accurate). This can cause anxiety in the audience. 
But what’s causing the anxiety here is not the magical illusion itself. 
11 It’s an interesting question what explains this divergence in taste with respect to magic. To say that people who don’t 
like magic are “epistemically uptight” just postpones the question. What does it mean to be epistemically uptight in 
the relevant sense? Perhaps recent philosophical and psychological research on epistemic emotions can provide some 
insight here. (See, for instance, the essays collected in İnan et al. (2018).) 
12 Every magician knows that people love recounting such experiences and are often eager to share them with others. 
And that strong magic can be so memorable is not surprising given that performances present us with seeming 
violations of the causal structure of the world as we understand it, something we seem to have an inbuilt drive to 
understand (Gopnik 1998). 
13 Roberts might claim that I’ve missed his point. His argument against treating magic as humor makes use of the 
account of the experience of magic in Leddington (2016). On that account, the experience of magic does not involve 
a conflict of beliefs, rather a conflict between a belief and a belief-like state that Tamar Gendler calls an “alief” (2008). 
According to Roberts, this is why “magic tricks do not create cognitive dissonance in the way required” (2019, 120). 
But he provides no argument here, and it’s hard to devise one. Aliefs are genuine cognitive states with representational 
content; so, they constitute authentically cognitive “interpretations” of their objects. Thus, when  aliefs conflict with 
beliefs, dissonance results, and it is genuinely cognitive. 
14 Compare Jamy Ian Swiss: “It should come as no surprise that many magical effects possess some degree of inherent 
humor…. The simple anomaly of the magical experience, the sudden jarring of the senses felt when fantasy crashes 
with reality, often produces a laugh of delight” (2002b, 165). 
15 Building on the account of the experience of magic in Leddington (2016), Meilin Chinn has recently argued that 
“the ironic and paradoxical cognitive requirements of stage magic” create audiences “primed...toward violating 
cognitive norms,” and so, more susceptible to accepting inconsistencies such as those involved in crude but effective 
Orientalist appropriations by white magicians (2019, 426; 429). The present argument suggests that Chinn’s analysis 
might extend to the comedy of unresolved incongruity in general. 
16 I suspect it also satisfies Roberts’ conditions (2019). 
17 You might worry that I’ve compromised my account. In discussing Carroll’s six conditions on comic amusement, I 
argued that—when properly appreciated—magic is neither anxiety-provoking nor annoying; but now I’ve admitted 
that magic is essentially unnerving, and aren’t unnerving things at least annoying? No. Compare: those who appreciate 
black humor find it neither anxiety-provoking nor annoying, but it can still be unnerving! Arguably, many of humor’s 
most interesting forms lie at its limits, just as we should expect. Again, on this point, see Double (2014, ch. 7). 
18 This paper is based on a talk originally presented at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics. 
Thanks to my audience there—especially Jerrold Levinson, Robert Hopkins, and Eva Dadlez—for their questions and 
comments. A much later draft was subject to a very useful close reading by the participants in Bence Nanay’s 
marvelous work-in-progress discussion group at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp. 
Thanks to everyone who read and commented. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 
2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 795393. 
